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Fifteen years after the former British colony’s “reunification with themotherland” on 1 July 1997, the relationship between mainland Chinaand Hong Kong remains as uneasy and conflict-ridden as ever. An in-
creasingly porous border, evidenced by an influx of mainlanders from day-
trippers to real estate speculators, as well as what is seen as the growing
political influence of Beijing, have sparked popular fear in the Special Ad-
ministrative Region (SAR) over the imminent “mainlandisation” (daluhua 大
陸化) of the city. Deepened resentment towards the mainland has also be-
come more openly and unabashedly expressed: In February 2012, a full-
page advertisement was printed on the local tabloid Apple Daily
condemning mainlanders as “locusts,” in retaliation for Peking University
professor Kong Qingdong’s provocative remarks that Hong Kongers are “bas-
tards” and “running dogs of the British government.” (1)
These recent flare-ups bring to the fore deeply rooted issues of belonging
and national identity in China’s post-colonial city. According to a survey
conducted in June 2012, the society’s self-identification as Chinese dropped
to a 13-year low on the eve of the 15th anniversary of reunification. (2) Peo-
ple in the SAR identify themselves most strongly as “Hong Kongers” (Xi-
anggangren 香港人), then in descending order as “members of the Chinese
nation” (Zhonghua minzu yifenzi 中華民族一份子), “Asians” (Yazhouren 亞
洲人), “Chinese” (Zhongguoren 中國人) and “global citizens” (shijie gong-
min世界公民). Worryingly for Beijing, identification with the title “nationals
of the People’s Republic of China” (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin
中華人民共和國國民) is found to be the lowest of all. For youths under the
age of 30, it is found that the number of those who view themselves as
“Hong Kongers” is 60-72 percent higher than those who identify themselves
as “Chinese.” (3)
It is at this perhaps unpropitious moment that the programmatic intro-
duction of patriotic lessons under the banner of guomin jiaoyu (國民教育),
or national education, was announced by the Hong Kong government. The
controversial decision contributed to one of the city’s most successful civil
movements since the handover and stimulated productive probes into the
enduring question of what it means to be a “patriotic,” “motherland-em-
bracing” national subject in a city where colonial legacies such as the rule
of law remain defensively treasured. What emerged from the debates also
highlights the tensions embedded in such seemingly unproblematic notions
as the city’s “necessary integration” with the mainland.
This article analyses the issues of belonging, national identity, and citi-
zenship through an examination of the national education debate and looks
ahead to the future of mainland-Hong Kong relations in the 18th Party Con-
gress era.
Learning to love China
During his visit to Hong Kong in commemoration of the 10th anniversary
of reunification in 2007, President Hu Jintao highlighted the need to
strengthen national education for youths in order to “pass on Hong Kong
compatriots’ glorious tradition of loving the country and loving Hong Kong”
(aiguo aigang de guangrong chuantong 愛國愛港的光榮傳統). This manifest
instruction from Beijing was swiftly heeded by the administration headed by
then Chief Executive Donald Tsang. The budget for national education wit-
nessed a staggering six-fold rise from HK$5 million in 2006 to HK$35.3 million
in 2007. (4) This figure further increased to HK$60 million in 2008. (5) In policy
addresses, Tsang pledged to give greater weight to elements of national edu-
cation in primary and secondary curricula. In 2007, the government vowed
to encourage more schools to assemble flag guard teams and promote flag-
raising ceremonies. A year later, a National Education Funding Scheme for
Young People was launched to subsidise large-scale events targeting young-
sters. The subsidy quota for secondary students to participate in mainland ex-
change trips was raised from 5,000 per year to 37,000. To promote national
education “in a more strategic and systematic manner,” a platform named
Passing on the Torch was created to facilitate coordination between voluntary
groups engaged in the organisation of exchange activities. (6)
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Producing national subjects and the de-Sinicisation debate in China’s post-colonial city
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cefc News Analysis
It was in Tsang’s 2010-2011 policy address that the introduction of Moral
and National Education (deyu ji guomin jiaoyu ke德育及國民教育科) as an
independent, standalone subject was proposed. Beijing’s design was clearly
articulated in an editorial that appeared in the People’s Daily overseas edi-
tion:
Many surveys have shown that Hong Kong youths’ knowledge of the
country’s condition (guoqing國情) is far from ideal. For instance, fif-
teen years after the SAR’s return, a significant proportion of young
people still have no idea what the May Fourth spirit represents; some
do not even know who the President is. The SAR government’s intro-
duction of Moral and National Education serves to fill these gaps in
knowledge of guoqing, and helps young people to adapt to the
changing times.
What concerns Beijing is not just the lamentable paucity of factual knowl-
edge about China, however. More important is what it perceives to be the
worryingly slow progress in the “return of people’s hearts” (renxin huigui人
心回歸) to the motherland. Since 1997, the land has (been) returned to
China, but not the hearts and minds of those who inhabit it. National edu-
cation in the post-colonial city, it is argued, is necessary to raise up a future
generation that will “grow to love our motherland and Hong Kong, aspire
to win honour and make contributions for our country, and have a strong
sense of pride as nationals of the People’s Republic of China.” (7)
Tsang’s curt, one-line proposal on the subject, buried in an otherwise
lengthy policy address, largely fell outside the media limelight and certainly
did not arouse the public uproar it did less than two years down the road.
Following the address, an ad hoc committee was set up in 2010 to see to
the subject’s implementation. A draft Curriculum Guide (kecheng zhiyin 課
程指引) prepared by the Curriculum Development Council was released in
May 2011, accompanied by a four-month period of public consultation. The
revised Curriculum Guide was formally announced in the final months of
the Tsang administration. On 30 April 2012, the Education Bureau declared
that Moral and National Education as a standalone subject is to be intro-
duced in a “progressive manner” through a three-year initiation period be-
fore it becomes compulsory in primary schools in 2015 and in secondary
schools in 2016. (8)
The series of incidents that precipitated the outpour of public anger, how-
ever, did not take place until Tsang had completed his second term in office.
On 4 July, days after Leung Chun-ying was inaugurated as the new Chief
Executive, the media reported the publication of a highly controversial
teaching handbook. Entitled The China Model (Zhongguo moshi中國模式),
the handbook lauds the Chinese Communist Party as a progressive, selfless,
and united ruling organisation (jinbu wusi yu tuanjie de zhizheng jituan進
步、無私與團結的執政集團) and commends the democratic (minzhu xing
民主性) and superior (xiuyue xing優越性) nature of China’s current political
system. The ideal model (lixiang xing理想型) of the Chinese system is con-
trasted with the ungainly American electoral system, in which people are
made to suffer the catastrophic consequences of pernicious competition
between parties (zhengdang e’dou renmin dangzai 政黨惡鬥，人民當災).
While it critically examines phenomena such as forceful land appropriation
(including the Wukan incident), contaminated milk powder, and the Wen-
zhou high-speed rail crash, the handbook steers clear of such politically sen-
sitive issues as the Cultural Revolution and the June Fourth tragedy. (9) An
editorial in Ming Pao, a local newspaper, condemned the handbook for
“putting makeup on the Chinese Communist Party and single-party author-
itarianism,” with the thinly veiled objective of “political brainwashing”
(zhengzhi xinao政治洗腦). (10)
The controversial text was compiled by Baptist University’s Advanced In-
stitute for Contemporary China Studies, newly founded in 2009 and cur-
rently headed by Victor Sit, a former member of the National People’s
Congress. The Institute worked under the appointment of the National Ed-
ucation Services Centre (Guomin jiaoyu fuwu zhongxin 國民教育服務中心),
set up by the Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers, a pro-Beijing or-
ganisation that receives substantial annual subsidies from the govern-
ment. (11) From 2008 to 2010, the Centre pocketed as much as HK$27.33
million in subsidies from the Education Bureau.
The dubious links between the government, pro-Beijing organisations, and
educational institutions unsettled the public. Hundreds joined in an online
petition denouncing Baptist University for sacrificing its academic integrity
for the fulfilment of dubious political assignments. (12) Similar arrangements
for the production of other national education materials were soon revealed.
Another program, criticised for “indoctrinating” credulous primary school
students by cultivating unreflective, sentimental notions of patriotism, was
compiled by an organisation affiliated with the City University of Hong Kong
after receiving HK$8 million in sponsorship from the Quality Education
Fund. The Blended Learning Curriculum Design for Hong Kong National Ed-
ucation has been adopted in at least 18 primary schools over the past three
years. (13)
Another aspect found problematic was the Assessment Program for
Affective and Social Outcomes (APASO) (qingyi ji shejiao biaoxian
pinggu 情意及社交表現評估) introduced by the Education Bureau. The
APASO consists of a number of scales by which students are to evaluate
their performance. One of these scales is “National Identity and Global
Citizenship,” useful as “an index on the duty to the nation, emotional
attachment to the national, global citizenship, and attitudes toward the
national” of schoolchildren. In its implementation, schools have devised
such measurements as “We should support the country even if the peo-
ple believe that the country has done wrong” and “We should buy made-
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in-China products in order to protect the employment situation in
China.” (14)
The adverse turn in public opinion days after the handover of power took
the Leung administrative by surprise. Deep suspicions of the new Chief Ex-
ecutive’s cosy relationship with Beijing – sentiments that Leung’s contender
for the top job, Henry Tang Ying-yen, had effectively exploited during the
election, and that Leung’s own actions after his victory have served to ag-
gravate – only intensified public anxiety over national education and con-
solidated distrust of the new government. Misguided and ill-considered
comments made by pro-Beijing supporters of national education helped lit-
tle in allaying concerns. Just as the outcry against “brainwashing” grew in
volume, National Education Services Centre representative Wong Chi-man
was quoted as saying that “all education is, to some extent, designed to
brainwash”: “I think the word ‘brainwash’ is too negative. It evokes something
out of ‘Clockwork Orange.’” (15)
Activism against “red indoctrination”
What followed was a rare collaboration between different forces against
national education in the society and the staging of civic action on a scale
comparable to the 1 July 2003 demonstration through which citizens suc-
cessfully blocked the introduction of an anti-subversion security law in the
Basic Law of Hong Kong. The first mass protest took place on 29 July, with
organisers reporting a turnout of 90,000. (16) A month later, as the summer
holidays drew to a close, an Occupy Tamar movement with protesters clad
in black took over the government headquarters at Admiralty. (17) The siege
lasted for ten days, during which a marathon hunger strike was staged, until
the Leung administration backed down on 8 September by cancelling the
three-year initiation period and promising that national education will not
be introduced as an independent subject within his term.
What was particularly noteworthy about this demonstration of collective
will was the extraordinarily marginal role played by the city’s political par-
ties, including the usually strident People Power. Although the pan-democ-
rats joined in the opposition against national education, they were not the
chief organisers of the crucial movement that eventually forced the gov-
ernment to change its mind. Instead, the pressure group behind the victory
was made up of students, parents, and teachers without a unified political
background. The Civic Alliance Against National Education (minjian fandui
guomin jiaouyu ke dalianmeng 民間反對國民教育科大聯盟) was estab-
lished in July 2012, led by the student body Scholarism (xuemin sichao 學
民思潮), the National Education Parents Concern Group, and the Hong Kong
Professional Teachers’ Union. Among these three, the young, post-90s ac-
tivists of Scholarism drew society-wide applause and brought “a glimmer
of hope,” according to political commentator Albert Cheng, to the city’s
democracy dream. (18)
Scholarism was founded by three secondary school students in May 2011
after the draft Curriculum Guide was first released for consultation, when
its core leader, Joshua Wong Chi-fung, was only 15. Scholarism used the so-
cial media network Facebook to draw attention to national education and
recruit supporters, attracting more than 200 student members. Funded by
members’ own pocket money and donations obtained through street rallies,
the group was efficiently organised with labour divided into policy, public
relations, music, and action teams. (19) During Occupy Tamar, which required
meticulous planning from the setting up of tents to the assembling of sound
systems, the young activists demonstrated “extraordinary discipline and or-
ganisational skills” and provided protesters with an abundant selection of
snacks and drinks that “would put [convenience store chain] 7-Eleven to
shame.” (20) They also showed keen political acumen by maintaining a cau-
tious distance from political parties, warning them off to prevent the move-
ment from being hijacked by mainstream politicians and to avoid
accusations of being used as puppets. From the beginning, the movement
has remained singularly focused on the issue of national education, one of
the key reasons, indeed, for its eventual success.
The high-profile activism of Scholarism attracted criticism and censorship.
South China Morning Post columnist Alex Lo alleged that it operates like “a
radical cult involving young children.” “Well, we don’t have a cult leader
yet,” he wrote in a piece entitled “Just who is brainwashing whom?”, “but
the pure enthusiasm, youthful rebellion, rejectionism, intransigence and
total contempt for the authorities are all on display.” (21) Asia Television (ATV),
a local broadcaster, went further to vilify Scholarism as a pawn (qizi 棋子)
manipulated by politicians backed by foreign powers in London and Wash-
ington. The 3 September episode of ATV Focus, an evening prime-time news
commentary broadcasted on weekdays, portrayed Hong Kong as polarised
between the “constructive camp” (jianshepai 建設派) and the “destructive
camp” (pohuaipai 破壞派). The student activists were labelled as “wilful
young ruffians” (renxing shiqi de eshao 任性使氣的惡少) who are “extremely
poor at playing politics,” adding the barely concealed threat that they were
putting their soul, studies, and futures at risk. (22) The program is understood
to be under the charge of Louie King-bun, former senior editor of the pro-
Beijing newspaper Ta Kung Pao. (23) In fact, the day after the controversial
show was released, Ta Kung Pao itself ran a front-page report assailing the
teachers and activists that joined the anti-national education hunger strike,
reviling them as “black hands” (heishou 黑手) controlled by political forces.
The provocative ATV program precipitated an avalanche of complaints.
Tens of thousands wrote to the communications authority saying that the
program had breached the authority’s code of practice, which states that
free-to-air television licensees should ensure that their programs are accu-
rate and impartial. The chief editor of ATV news resigned. (24) Chang Ping, one
of China’s best-known commentators, called the episode Hong Kong’s “4/26
moment.” He drew parallels with the 1989 Tiananmen democracy move-
ment – “the same young faces, the same steel in their eyes, the burning pas-
sion, the fearlessness” – and compared the ATV program to the notorious
People’s Daily editorial of 26 April 1989, which branded the peaceful demon-
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strations in Beijing an upheaval. He observed the same tactics deployed
against students: belittling their intelligence by depicting them as manipu-
lated puppets, and representing them as a grave threat to social stability.(25)
The attachment of the “black hand” label is nothing new – It has been vari-
ously applied to democracy advocates such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu
Xiaobo. Worryingly, it is the same repertoire of strategies and stock of lexi-
cons that these Hong Kong news groups are now faithfully drawing from.
The mainland media did not extensively cover the Hong Kong protests.
When they did, they showed clear disapproval. A Global Times editorial ex-
pressed its surprise at the “strong emotions and lack of rationality” that riv-
eted Hong Kong society, saying that it behaved like “Cairo one year ago”
rather than “a developed democratic society.” (26) Mostly it resorted to in-
formation blocks. Scholarism’s account on Sina Weibo was frozen, and for
a time, keywords such as “national education” and “Leung Chun-ying” were
reportedly banned from microblog searches.(27)
Censorship did not prevent mainlanders from showing solidarity for the
movement raging on the other side of the border. Among the most vocal
are those now living and working in the SAR. Speaking at a public forum,
Hong Kong-based journalists Hui Kei and Zhang Jieping shared their expe-
rience of being brought up to unconditionally love the Communist Party
under the Chinese education system. “National education is packaged to
not look like brainwashing, so Hongkongers will be willing to have a trial
run,” Zhang cautioned. “But once thoughts take root, there will be no turning
back.” (28) Another widely circulated essay was penned by a mainland student
living in Hong Kong, in which the author presents a powerful critique of pa-
triotic education for encouraging the mindless glorification and repetition
of what both teachers and students know to be lies.(29) Disconcertingly, such
gestures of support for Hong Kong proved to be dangerous. Zhang Xuedong,
a teacher at the East China University of Political Science and Law in Shang-
hai, was suspended for airing anti-national education views on his Sina
Weibo account. An outspoken critic, Zhang had previously petitioned
China’s Education Minister Yuan Guiren to abolish compulsory classes and
exams on Marxism for university students.(30)
Nationalism with Hong Kong characteristics?
The national education debate directed attention to the fundamental
issue of what patriotism and nationalism mean for the SAR: Should there,
indeed, be a version of “nationalism with Hong Kong characteristics”? “It is
as ridiculous as it is sad that, while the world is hungry for knowledge and
understanding of a country that is home to one-fifth of the world’s popu-
lation and its second-largest economy, we in Hong Kong are rejecting this
need,” writes a lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Young
people in Hong Kong know so little about China that getting to know it is
as essential as learning addition and subtraction.” (31) It would be a grave
mistake, however, to simplistically label opponents of national education
as refusing to learn anything about China. Many were against national ed-
ucation as it was designed and conceived by the Education Bureau, and not
necessarily against introducing the subject itself.
The strongest critique concerns the kind of nationalism being fostered as
defined by the Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide. Tsang Wing-
kwong, professor at Chinese University, points out that the proposed na-
tional education encourages a kind of primordial, essentialist nationalism
that is irrelevant to and incompatible with the situation of the SAR. It is
built on dated notions of kinship ties, geographical embeddedness and
boundedness, and feelings of consanguinity as found in concepts such as
“blood is thicker than water” (xuenong yushui 血濃於水), “descendants of
Yanhuang” (Yanhuang zisun 炎黃子孫), and “sons and daughters of the land
of the Yellow River” (Huanghe dadi de ernü 黃河大地的兒女). This type of
ethnic nationalism based on deep-seated, narrowly-defined notions of
“same roots, same hearts” (tonggen tongxin 同根同心) often conflates
“family” and “nation” and leads easily into exclusivistic ethnocentrism. The
draft Curriculum Guide also explicitly adopts a passion-based (yiqing weiben
以情為本) or inspiration-by-passion (yiqing yinfa 以情引發) approach in ed-
ucating youngsters.(32)
What is appropriate for Hong Kong, Tsang proposes, is the cultivation of
“civic nationalism.” In contrast to ethnic nationalism, which builds solidarity
based on irreducible and unchanging elements such as blood ties, civic na-
tionalism emphasises a sentiment of “comradeship” based on the equal par-
ticipation and mutual cooperation taking place within what German thinker
Jürgen Habermas called “a community of citizens,” with the collective vision
of sharing in the same fate (gongtong mingyun 共同命運) and being in the
same boat (tongzhou gongji 同舟共濟). Eric Ma, professor at Chinese Uni-
versity, makes the similar argument that any form of national education for
the city must seek to bring up “citizen-nationals” (gongmin guomin 公民國
民) who respect basic humanity and do not distinguish between we-group
and them-group, love and hate based on blood ties.(33)
While some believe that national education as a subject can be retained
with its problematic contents plucked out, others advocate for a more fun-
damental reform that replaces guomin education with citizenship or civic
education (gongmin jiaoyu 公民教育). The city’s ethnic minorities, for ex-
ample, have rallied alongside opponents of national education, saying that
the proposed curriculum marginalises them and risks engendering racism (34)
An honorary adviser of the Hong Kong Association of the Heads of Sec-
ondary Schools recommends the introduction of a citizenship education
that cultivates “democratic and constructive patriotism” through promot-
ing the universal values of multiculturalism, pluralism, and cosmopoli-
tanism.(35) The Hong Kong Alliance for Civic Education has since 2002
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worked towards the development of teaching materials for schools in this
direction. (36)
A second point of contention is the suspiciously urgent introduction of
national education when the teaching of Chinese history itself has been
neglected for more than a decade. In the curriculum reform initiated in
2000, it was determined that Chinese History was no longer required to be
taught as an independent, standalone subject. Instead, the teaching of Chi-
nese History can be broken down and parcelled out, for example through
combination with World History or incorporation into an Integrated Hu-
manities program. Only 5 percent of total school hours need to be allocated
to Chinese history-related topics. As of 2008, only about 70 percent of sec-
ondary schools still kept Chinese History on their lists of subjects. (37) Barely
more than 8,300 out of some 73,000 student candidates took the Chinese
History paper in the 2012 Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education Ex-
amination, less than half of the number of students who, for instance, took
Chemistry or Economics. The number is expected to fall further. (38)
Many have since called for the resurrection of Chinese History as a com-
pulsory subject in junior secondary forms. In 2008, the Hong Kong Feder-
ation of Education Workers joined forces with Education Convergence and
two history teachers’ groups to form the “united action group on the pop-
ularisation of national history education” (guanzhu puji guoshi jiaoyu
lianhe xingtongzu 關注普及國史教育聯合行動組), petitioning the Tsang
administration to bring the subject back. Then in June 2011, after the gov-
ernment released the consultation draft for Moral and National Education,
the Democratic Party tabled a motion to reinstate Chinese History. Iron-
ically, the demand was blocked by the pro-establishment camp. (39) The
apparent lack of concern for Chinese History teaching stood in stark con-
trast to the displayed enthusiasm for national education, and made the
public reasonably wary of the genuine intentions behind the insistent push
for the program’s introduction.
“De-Sinicising” Hong Kong
The national education controversy also led to an intense debate over the
phenomenon of “de-Sinofication” or “de-Sinicisation” (qu Zhongguohua 去
中國化) in Hong Kong. The term de-Sinicisation has been most strongly as-
sociated with the pro-Taiwan independence or the Taiwanisation (Taiwan
bentuhua yundong 臺灣本土化運動) movements, which under the Chen
Shui-bian administration from 2000-2008 led to campaigns aimed at elim-
inating Chinese influence and strengthening the separateness of Taiwanese
identity. To Beijing, the de-Sinicisation label basically entails the most seri-
ous offense of advocating secession, separatism, and independence with
the aim of breaking up China.
As the national education debate raged on, two influential Hong Kong-
based commentators of Yazhou Zhoukan (亞洲週刊) – a newsmagazine
founded by Time Warner in 1987 and bought out by the Ming Pao Group –
wrote that the controversy is putting the city in a “very dangerous” de-Sini-
cisation crisis (qu Zhongguohua weiji 去中國化危機). Tan King-sin argued
that opponents of national education have thrown out the “China” baby
(Zhongguo 中國) when they tried to get rid of the murky “Chinese Com-
munist Party” (Zhonggong 中共) bathwater. “China” has become a term hi-
jacked by politics and a target of unrelenting demonisation (bei yaomohua
被妖魔化). (40) Editor-in-chief Yau Lop-poon cautioned that by not drawing
a clear distinction between the Party and the state (dangguo bufen 黨國不
分), “anti-Communist sentiment has unknowingly evolved into anti-China
sentiment.” (41) Yau argued that Hong Kong is “losing China” (Xianggang
zhengzai shiqu Zhongguo 香港正在失去中國) and turning into an “ahistor-
ical city” (qu lishi de chengshi 去歷史的城市), and called upon the populace
to rediscover its own narration and knowledge of China (minjian Zhongguo
lunshu 民間中國論述).
The de-Sinicisation debate was triggered by the waving of British flags
and the colonial flags of Hong Kong at recent protests, including at anti-
national education rallies. The Facebook Group “Raise the Flag on Hong
Kong” (Xianggangqi piaoyang 香港旗飄揚), for example, advocates the use
of colonial flags to show discontent with the current administration and to
“resist China’s colonial rule in Hong Kong” (fandui Zhongguo dui Xianggang
shixing zhimin tongzhi 反對中國對香港實行殖民統治). The pieces by Tan
and Yau further cited growing publicity for the Hong Kong City-State Au-
tonomy Movement (Xianggang chengbang zizhi yundong 香港城邦自治運
動). The Autonomy Movement was initiated based on the influential writings
of Dr. Chin Wan-kan, who teaches Chinese studies at Lingnan University.
Chin argues that Hong Kong has a quality of “purity” it should not lose and
advocates for it to become a self-governing city-state. (42) Publicity for the
Autonomy Movement has grown with exacerbating relations between
mainlanders and Hong Kongers aggravated by a series of incidents. In mid-
September, the Liberate Sheung Shui Station campaign (guangfu Shangshui
zhan 光復上水站) was organised by netizens, with British flags and placards
reading “Chinese people scram back to China!” used to protest the influx of
parallel goods traders.
The Yazhou Zhoukan pieces were received with trepidation by some of the
city’s public intellectuals. Journalist Ng Chi-sum penned an alarmed reply cau-
tioning against the careless gesture of putting the de-Sinicisation hat
(koushang qu Zhongguohua de maozi 扣上「去中國化」的帽子) on the anti-
national education movement. The Autonomy Movement remains a minority
in the city, Ng points out, and had little if any influence on the anti-national
education movement. Rather than de-Sinicisation, what the movement hoped
to achieve was eliminating the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (qu
Zhonggonghua 去中共化) and preventing Party worship. Applying the de-
Sinicisation label is a dangerous move that puts Hong Kong’s civil society on
equal footing with those rallying for Taiwan independence. (43)
Ng’s premonition of political escalation proved justified. As anti-national
education rallies petered out in October, officials began to strike back
through a series of high-profile public remarks targeting “forces” calling for
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independence (Gangdu shili 港獨勢力). China Daily bluntly characterised
the Moral and National Education debate as “a political duel between na-
tional identity recognition and ‘Hong Kong independence’ activists.” (44) For-
mer deputy director of Beijing’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Chen
Zuo’er warned that separatist forces are “spreading as quickly as a virus” in
the SAR. (45) The Office’s former director, Lu Ping, attacked advocates of sep-
aratism as “sheer morons” and remarked with acrimoniousness that they
should renounce their Chinese nationality, as China “would not be bothered
losing this handful of people.” (46) In certain commentaries, the SAR is por-
trayed as a base for foreigners scheming to destabilise China. The China
Daily piece said that “Hong Kong has become a beachhead for Western
powers headed by the US […] and they have trained a bunch of native
speakers to act as their functionaries with a much larger number of follow-
ers.” (47) Lew Mon-hung, a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference, alleged that Hong Kong is being built into a bridgehead
for Americans to bring about a colour revolution in China. (48)
The worrying escalation of the national education debate against the
background of growing mutual enmity demonstrates the fragile and volatile
state of relations between mainland China and Hong Kong. As a Ming Pao
editorial soundly cautions, the politically charged labels of “de-Sinicisation”
and “separatist forces” risk upgrading the city’s politics to the level of ide-
ological struggles (shanggang shangxian 上綱上綫) through the manufac-
turing of false enemies and contradictions (diwo maodun 敵我矛盾). (49)
Should Beijing take to the diagnosis that Hong Kong is under the “viral”
threat of forces vying for independence, greater intervention in the SAR’s
affairs through appendages such as the Central Liaison Office will only be
legitimised as a necessary prescription.
A deadlocked government
Managing the increasingly delicate relationship between the mainland
and Hong Kong will thus be one of the top governing challenges of the new
SAR administration. It must demonstrate loyalty to Beijing, appease local
supporters, and at the same time be responsive to an increasingly vocal civil
society. The national education controversy has demonstrated the compli-
cated considerations and potential difficulties associated with such a task,
and the Leung administration’s management of the rapidly unfolding crisis
was found wanting. The launching of the Occupy Tamar movement left
Leung staunchly unmoved. Even into the fifth day of the siege, Leung told
protesters that the “precondition” for talks “cannot be withdrawing or not
withdrawing” the program. (50) He changed his mind five days later, vowing
not to forcibly introduce national education within his term.
Granted, the newly inaugurated administration was inexperienced. An of-
ficial later admitted that the government was encumbered by a combina-
tion of a “brand new” education minister and “baggage-carrying” officials
who, having participated in the preparation of national education for years
under the Tsang administration, saw its introduction as a matter of “normal
course” and following “standard operational procedures.” (51) Nonetheless,
the administration’s delayed reaction also showed its straddled position. On
the one hand, it misjudged the extent and tenacity of public opposition and
must struggle belatedly to maintain its popular legitimacy. On the other
hand, it had to take into account the political interests of its own supporters
in the government, including many Beijing-friendly groups that have braved
public opinion and stood for national education.
The strategic significance of both was magnified with the 2012 Legislative
Council election taking place in September, in which the makeup of the
city’s new legislature for the next four years was to be decided. The 2012
election was significant in that it was the first election to take place after
the passage of the constitutional reform package in 2010. Under the new
format, the number of seats has increased from 60 to 70, with an additional
five seats for both geographical constituencies (GCs) and functional con-
stituencies (FCs). The FCs category has since its inception been criticised as
dominated by anti-democratic special interest groups with links to Beijing,
and elected based on extremely narrow mandates. The five newly added
seats under FCs, colloquially referred to as “superseats,” were instead elected
by all registered voters who are not eligible to vote in traditional FCs. Based
on a much broader public mandate, the superseats opened a new battle-
ground for the pro-establishment and pan-democratic camps.
At first the government, straddled by the pro-establishment camp’s con-
cern that backing down on national education would help the pan-democ-
rats gained political capital, insisted on launching the program. Their
underestimation of the resilience of public opposition eventually forced the
government to haphazardly abandon its policy just one day before the elec-
tion in order to avoid an electoral disaster. The pan-democrats’ clear stance
against national education, however, seemed to have translated weakly in
bolstering electoral support. Although they performed well in the FCs, se-
curing three out of five superseats and increasing their traditional FCs seats
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from four to six, in the GCs they secured only 18 out of 35 seats, a disap-
pointing result compared with the 19 out of 30 seats won four years ago. (52)
It remained unclear whether the last-minute concession offered by Leung
appeased some voters and thereby assisted the pro-establishment camp in
the election. Many of the victories won by pro-establishment candidates
could be attributed to a formidable system of centralised planning and
meticulous coordination (peipiao 配票) that proved particularly useful under
a system of party-list proportional representation based on the Hare quota.
Some from the pro-establishment camp, in fact, found Leung’s climb-down
strikingly ill-timed. Lau Nai-keung, a member of the Basic Law Committee
of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, called Leung’s in-
opportune announcement a “clumsy political move” that pleased no one.
“To those who braved unspeakable pressure to come forward to show their
support for national education,” he argued, “this amounts to an unprincipled
sell-out.” (53) Attending to increasingly vocal public opinion amidst a general
anti-mainland atmosphere while not alienating loyal supporters within the
government will be a growing challenge for the SAR administration.
The 18th Party Congress Reshuffle
The once-in-a-decade leadership transition in China will have an impact
on mainland-Hong Kong relations. As analysts point out, the new Politburo
Standing Committee included “an unprecedented number of party officials
with strong Hong Kong connections”. (54) Xi Jinping, the new President, has
been heading the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
since 2007. Zhang Dejiang, who was Guangdong party secretary from 2002
to 2007, and Zhang Gaoli, who was Shenzhen party secretary from 1997
to 2001, both met with SAR officials on a regular basis during their time in
the southern province. Looking ahead, as Xi takes up his new position as
the top leader of China, he will continue to chair the Leading Group but will
become altogether less hands-on with regard to the affairs of the SAR. At
the same time, though he failed to join the Standing Committee, Li Yuan-
chao is tipped to be promoted to vice-president, who, according to tradition,
is responsible for supervising Hong Kong affairs. Li is a close protégé of Hu
Jintao known for his relative open-mindedness, and his appointment “could
mean a relatively open atmosphere for Hong Kong.” (55)
Despite this hopeful sign, political commentator Johnny Lau Yui-siu be-
lieves that the central government is gradually “losing patience” with the
intractable city. Members of the powerful Politburo have developed an “an-
tagonistic mentality” and are ready to put the city “in a tighter Beijing
grip.” (56) A changing tone can already be detected in Hu Jintao’s report at
the 18th Party Congress. In his section on Hong Kong and Macau affairs, two
new expressions have been picked out by analysts as signals of a novel Bei-
jing interpretation of the SAR’s political situation. (57)The first is the new em-
phasis on the importance of “protecting national sovereignty, security, and
developmental interests” (weihu guojia zhuquan anquan fazhan liyi 維護國
家主權、安全、發展利益), in contrast to the past focus on defending the
principles of “one country, two systems,” “Hong Kong people governing
Hong Kong” and “a high degree of autonomy.” Hu pointedly highlighted the
need to “prevent and stop foreign forces (waibu shili 外部勢力) from inter-
fering in Hong Kong and Macau affairs.” Following his report, the deputy
director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office published a 6,000-word ar-
ticle in the pro-Beijing Wen Wei Po calling on the SAR government to leg-
islate the anti-subversion security law Article 23 “in due course” to combat
growing “external interference”. (58)
The second is the novel expression that Hong Kongers must “share in the
integrity and glory of being Chinese” (gongxiang zuo Zhongguoren de zun-
yan he rongyao 共享做中國人的尊嚴和榮耀). This gentle reminder directly
points to the “return of people’s hearts”: As a Global Times editorial points
out, mainlanders have grown “quite uncomfortable with a few Hong Kong
people’s nostalgia for its colonial past and sense of superiority against main-
landers.” (59)
What mainland officials perceive to be the growing power of de-Sinicisa-
tion and separatist forces in the SAR may indeed harden their resolve and
strengthen their belief that Hong Kong youths need a healthy dose of na-
tional education. With the controversial Moral and National Education Cur-
riculum Guide shelved on October 8, the Civic Alliance Against National
Education has called it a temporary victory. Others believe that the govern-
ment’s climb-down is only a delaying tactic, as the introduction of national
education has only been shelved, not completely abolished. (60) Given the
freedom to decide whether to introduce national education and how to in-
troduce it, individual schools have now become the new battlefields for vig-
ilant activists, and for more optimistic educators the new laboratories for
developing more objective syllabi to teach the next generation about China.
While Hong Kongers will not see the government push for national educa-
tion in the next five years, the issue will remain a highly sensitive one as
citizens of the former British colony continue to negotiate their identity
and grapple with the profound implications of their city’s return to Chinese
rule.
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